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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

TOM SNYDER,
:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

Case No.

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
20010203-SC

MURRAY CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation and
H. CRAIG HALL, City Attorney
for Murray City Corporation,
Defendants/Appellees.

:

Plaintiff/Appellant Tom Snyder submits the following reply
brief:

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Murray City and H. Craig Hall (hereinafter "Murray City"
"The City") have not filed an appeal.

The City's gratuitous

recitation of its "issues presented for review" in Mr. Snyder's
appeal is not helpful.

The opening brief filed by appellant, Tom

Snyder, sets forth the issues presented for review and now before
this Court.

No other issues are before the court in this matter.

REPLY TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS
The City asserts that Snyder is not entitled to revisit the
factual background of this case and that Snyder is bound by the
conclusions of the federal courts.

Brief of Appellees, pp. 3-4.

Murray City cites no authority its assertion.

Snyder's current

state claims are unique from those determined by the federal
courts.

Snyder's state claims differ from those determined by

the federal courts.

See Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d

1349, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1997).
The City suggests that the Opening Ceremony is to "include
an inspirational thought or message, which may include a prayer .
. . ."

Brief of Appellees, p. 5.

aside primarily for opening prayer.

However, the time was set
Hall Letter, June 1, 1994

(R. 128) (reverence period is referred to as "prayer" and
distinguished specifically from "comments").
The City suggests that its policy has been "to expect and
encourage those persons giving commencement thoughts or prayers
to promote civility, lofty thoughts and attention to agenda
items."

Brief of Appellees, p. 5.

There is no evidence that the

City had any criteria concerning prayers before Snyder requested
to give his prayer.

Instead, rather than placing any limits or

requirements or even making suggestions concerning the content of
opening prayers, letters sent by the City to those interested in
participating in the ceremonies spoke only of dates and times.
Depo. of Hall at 12-13, 14-15 & 25 (R. 144, 145, 147). The City
admits that none of the letters sent to interested participants
contained any reference to standards or content requirements that
would be applied to potential opening prayers.

2

Id.

The City

presents no evidence that any standards or content requirements
were ever communicated verbally to those interested in presenting
prayers during the Opening Ceremonies.

Id.

The City never

communicated these exceptions to any participants in the Opening
Ceremonies; these expectations were secret, unilateral and
meaningless.

Id.

Only after the City knew the contents of Snyder's proposed
Opening Prayer, (Depo. of Hall at 18-20 (R. 146)), did the City
reveal its supposed criteria for opening prayers.

Hall Letter,

June 1, 1994 (R. 128). The criteria recited in that letter was
tailor-made for Snyder.
anyone else.

This criteria had never been applied to

Depo. of Hall at 12-13 (R. 144). Thus, the City

did not have a policy concerning opening prayers other than its
ad hoc policy specifically created to exclude Snyder.
The City reiterates that it attempted to insure a diversity
of religious views and other opinions were expressed during its
Opening Ceremonies.

Brief of Appellees, p. 5.

Allowing Snyder

to present his prayer during the Opening Ceremonies would further
the City's goal of diversity.

Snyder's prayer presents non-

mainstream opinions and religious views.
The City attempts to distinguish between public expenditures
for religious expression and public expenditures Mfor the meeting
and that portion of the agenda that consists of . . . prayers.''
Brief of Appellees, p. 6.

The City's hair splitting should be

3

dismissed outright.
religious expression.

The public expenditures are clearly for
Society of Separationists v. Whitehead,

870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
The City claims that no one has given a prayer or invocation
during the Opening Ceremonies that attacked City policies or
expressed political views.

Brief of Appellees, p. 9.

However,

political views have been presented as part of the Opening
Ceremonies.

The City allows political views to be proclaimed

during the Opening Ceremonies as long as Mr. Hall agrees with the
political views expressed or finds them otherwise appropriate.
Depo. of Hall at 25-26 (R. 147-148).
Hall testified that the opening prayers given "during the
past 10, 12 years" have been "positive, upbeat, exhorting the
City Council to do what they [sic] ought to do under their
statutory responsibilities."

Depo. of Hall at 25 (R. 147). When

asked "[s]o it's not all political views then that are banned,"
Hall replied that "I don't know that until I see what political
views are proposed.
point."

I would have to make a decision at that

Depo. of Hall at 26 (R. 148). Thus, the City allows

upbeat political statements concerning the City's lawmaking
purposes, other political issues are left to Hall's sole
discretion.

Id.

Snyder's sincerity (or lack of sincerity) did not factor
into the City's June 30, 1994 decision to refuse to allow him to

4

offer his Opening Prayer during the Opening Ceremonies.

Depo. of

Hall at 54-55 (R. 154). The City rejected the Opening Prayer
because of its specific content and not because the City thought
that the prayer and/or Snyder were insincere.

Id.

To propose

insincerity now, to justify the City's misconduct, is spurious.
Brief of Appellees, pp. 12-14.

Rather, at issue is the

unconstitutional reasons that the City actually used to reject
Snyder's prayer.
The City suggests again that it had a policy, albeit
unannounced and never communicated, to expect and encourage the
opening prayers or thoughts to promote civility, lofty ideas and
attention to the agenda.

Brief of Appellees, p. 9.

In reality,

the City had no policy regarding the opening prayers until it
created a policy with which it could reject Snyder's prayer.
In reply to Snyder's request to give a prayer, the City did
not mention civility, loftiness or attention to the agenda.

Hall

Letters, June 1 and 30, 1994, (R. 128, 134). Thus, until this
suit was filed and until Mr. Hall's deposition was taken, Snyder
was not informed of any City policy other than:
. . . the Council has established the policy that
all council meetings will start with prayer.
The purpose of the "prayer" is to allow
individuals that opportunity to express thoughts, leave
blessing, etc. It is not a time to express political
views, attack city policies or practices or mock city
practices or policies.

5

Hall Letter, June 1, 1994 (R. 128).

If Mr. Hall at some time

determined that the Opening Prayer "did not encourage people to
have lofty thoughts, did not encourage people to be civil," etc.,
he did not inform Snyder that this was the basis of his
rejection.

This City "policy" was kept secret even from Snyder;

the City's statements concerning this policy are suspect.
The City seems suggests that because it offered Snyder the
opportunity during another part of its meetings to express his
view, it did not violate Snyder's constitutional rights when it
barred his prayer from the Opening Ceremonies.
Appellees, pp. 7 & 10.

Brief of

The public comment period is not set

aside for prayer and does not have the prestige or influence
enjoyed by the Opening Ceremonies.

The City cannot justify its

discrimination against Snyder's religious message by suggesting
that he could have spoken at another time.
The City's references to Snyder's religious beliefs are
inappropriate and irrelevant.

Brief of Appellees, pp. 10-11.

While the City may not understand or appreciate Snyder's
religious beliefs, the Utah Constitution protects all religious
exercise equally, regardless of content or message.

Society of

Separationists, 870 P.2d at 936 (Utah 1993); United States v.
Ward, 989 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1992); Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333 (1970).

The City may not judge the credibility of Mr.

Snyder's religious beliefs.

United States v. Seeqer, 380 U.S.

6

163, 184 (1964) ("The validity of what [an individual] believes
cannot be questioned."
Government.")

"[TJhese inquires are foreclosed to

"[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable,

logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection."

Thomas v. Review Board,

Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1980).
The City must also accept Mr. Snyder's personal estimation of his
religious beliefs:

"In such an intensely personal area, of

course, the claim of the [individual] that his belief is an
essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight."
United States v. Seeqer, 380 U.S. at 184.
The City's reference to the specifics of Snyder's religious
view, its reference to the origin of Snyder's Opening Prayer and
his motivation for giving the prayer are irrelevant to the
present inquiry.

Brief of Appellees, pp. 10-14.

The City

affirms that the sincerity of Snyder did not factor into its
decision to refuse him the opportunity to offer his Opening
Prayer during the Opening Ceremonies.

Brief of Appellees, p. 9.

The City rejected the Opening Prayer because of its specific
content and not because the City thought that the prayer and/or
Snyder were insincere.

Brief of Appellees, pp. 10-14.

Snyder's motivation for giving his Opening Prayer is not
indicative of whether his beliefs are sincere.

Mixed motivations

(political, philosophical, and/or religious) should not cast

7

doubt on Snyder's sincerity.

The most sincere religious devotees

may have mixed motives for a decision to give a prayer before the
City Council.

The City's repeated references to the origin of

the Opening Prayer and Snyder's motivations for giving it are
immaterial and irrelevant.

SUMMARY OF THE REPLY ARGUMENT
Res Judicata is inapplicable to Snyder's state law claims.
Based upon the unique issues raised under Utah Constitutional
Law, Mr. Snyder's state-law claims were dismissed without
prejudice. Given the unique protection afforded religious
freedoms in Utah, this Court is entitled to make its own factual
determinations, and is entitled to review Snyder's remaining
state-law claims.
The City's refusal to permit Snyder to give his prayer
before the Murray City Council violates Snyder's right to free
exercise of religion under Article I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution.

Utah law is designed to protect religious exercise

and freedom of conscience and prevent limitations based on
religious beliefs.

Under Society of Separationists, Murray City

violated Snyder's Art. I, § 4 right to perfect religious
toleration.

The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's

religious exercise and violated his right to free exercise.
Snyder's Free Speech Claim is timely and was properly before
the court below.

This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have
8

recognized a "continuing wrong" theory when applying a statute of
limitations.

The City takes the position today that Utah law

does not afford Snyder access to the prayer portion of the City
Council meetings.

Snyder's Free Speech claim is a facial

challenge to the current unwritten policies and practices of the
City.
By refusing to allow Snyder to pray before the Murray City
Council, the City violated Article I, § 15 of the Utah
Constitution.

The Opening Ceremony is a limited (or designated)

public forum.

As a result, any regulation must serve a

compelling state interest and must be narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.

The City has not done so.

The interests asserted by

the City are not compelling to justify the restriction of free
speech under the Utah Constitution.
Murray City's practice of prayers before City Council
meetings is not applied in a neutral matter and violates Article
I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.

The Utah Constitution does not

permit public expenditures and the use of public property to
"directly" benefit religious exercise.

The City may encourage

public prayer at its Council meetings only when "the state is
neutral" and thereby "indirectly" benefitting religious exercise.
The City's bias against Snyder's religious message violates
the "neutrality principal."

Those, like Snyder, who express non-

traditional or unorthodox religious viewpoints, are prohibited
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from participating in religious offerings before the City
Council.
The City provided Snyder with no due process in his request
to present his prayer.

The essential requirements of due process

are notice and an opportunity to respond.

The City failed to

supply Snyder with even basic protection.

Simple due process

protections—written criteria, notice, an opportunity to respond,
an impartial arbiter, findings, notice of the right to appeal, an
appellate review—may have prevented the harm to Snyder.

REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

RES JUDICATA IS INAPPLICABLE TO SNYDER'S STATE LAW CLAIMS.
Murray City is correct in that Snyder is prohibited from

again raising his federal claims.
adjudicated.

Those legal issues have been

However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

recognized the unique issues raised under Utah Constitutional
Law, and dismissed without prejudice Mr. Snyder's state-law
claims as follows:
The Supreme Court of Utah recently rejected a
challenge to Salt Lake City's practice of opening its
city council meetings with a prayer. Society of
Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993).
While that challenge was brought under the provision of
Utah's Constitution which prohibited the expenditure of
public monies for religious purposes and not under its
Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses, the Supreme Court
of Utah stated in Society of Separationists that it would
not follow federal constitutional models in interpreting
the Religion Clauses of the Utah Constitution. Id. at
930, 931 n.36. Given that the interpretation of those
Clauses appears to be undergoing an evolution, and given
10

the complex issues of state law presented, we decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Snyder's
state-law claims.
Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 124 F.3d 1349, 1354-55 (10th Cir.
1997) .
While the Court of Appeals highlighted Snyder's rights
regarding the religion clauses of the Utah Constitution, the
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over any of his state-law
claims so that he could pursue them in the appropriate court.
The City argues that this Court should accept as absolute
the factual findings made by the United States District Court.
Brief of Appellees, p. 4.

There has never been a trial regarding

the factual underpinnings in this case.
decided on Summary Judgment motions.

These "facts" were

A court does not make

factual findings in determining a summary judgment.

There has

been no full and fair litigation of any of the issues the City
desires this Court to now adopt.
Candidly, the City admits that it "has been unable to find a
Utah case expressly addressing the question whether claim or
issue preclusion serves to prevent relitigation in Utah state
courts of civil claims or issues in federal courts . . . ."
Brief of Appellees, p. 20.

Res Judicata

is inapplicable.

Given

the unique protection afforded religious freedoms in Utah, this
Court is entitled to make its own factual determinations, and is
entitled to review Snyder's remaining state-law claims.
11

II.

FREE EXERCISE CLAIM:

A.

THE CITY'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT SNYDER TO GIVE HIS PRAYER
BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY COUNCIL VIOLATES SNYDER'S RIGHT TO
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION UNDER ARTICLE I, § 4 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
The City argues that it had no affirmative duty to provide

Snyder a forum to exercise his religion.
25.

Brief of Appellees, p.

The City refers to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

decision in response to Snyder's Free Exercise Claim.

Id.

While

the City's position may be accurate under federal constitutional
law, the Utah Constitution provides Snyder more protection.
Article III of the Utah Constitution states that "
toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed."

[p]erfect

Based on this

strong language, Art. I, § 4, the legislative and general history
of Utah, this Court determined that Utah law "is designed to
protect religious exercise and freedom of conscience in general .
. . and to prevent the imposition of civil limitations based on
one's religious beliefs or lack thereof."

Society of Separa-

tionists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 935 (Utah 1993).

This Court

concluded that the Utah Constitution mandated government
neutrality toward religious practices.
This Court defined a prayer

Id. at 936.

as "an address of entreaty,

supplication, praise or thanksgiving directed to some sacred or
divine spirit, being or object."

Society of Separationists, 870

P.2d at 931-32 (quoting Karen B. v. Trenn, 653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th
Cir. 1981), aff'd mem. 455 U.S. 913 (1982)).
12

In Utah, an address

which calls upon a celestial or supreme entity is prayer and is
religious exercise even though it may appear to be non-religious
or have a secular purpose:

"That [a prayer] may contemplate some

wholly secular objective cannot alter the inherently religious
character of the exercise." Id.
Therefore, under Society of Separationists, Murray City
violated Snyder's Art. I, § 4 right to perfect religious
toleration.
exercise.

Snyder's supplication is a prayer and a religious

The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's

religious exercise and violated his right to free exercise.
The City argues that its suppression of Snyder religious
views was justified because his prayer was political or philosophical in nature.

Brief of Appellees, p. 27, 381, & 39.

Nevertheless, under Society of Separationists, the City cannot
discriminate against Snyder's prayer based on the City's misperception that the prayer was not religious.
The City suggests that because it offered Snyder the
opportunity during another part of its meetings to express his
view, it did not violate Snyder's constitutional rights. What
the City offered to Snyder is the part of its meeting open to
general public comment.

Brief of Appellees, pp. 25, 27, & 46.

1

Of note, the City's true position is they can discern the
nature of an offering. The City asserts, "What Appellant
proposed to say in the Opening Ceremony is not a legislative
prayer at all, but a piece of partisan political rhetoric."
Brief of Appellees, p. 38.
13

The public comment period is not set aside for prayer and does
not have the prestige or influence enjoyed by the Opening
Ceremonies.

The City cannot justify its discrimination against

Snyder' s religious message by suggesting that he could have
spoken at another time.

Relegating Snyder to the public comment

period of the meeting ("to the back of the bus") because the City
finds Snyder's religious message offensive is as repugnant and
unconstitutional as entirely banning his prayer from the meeting.
B.

THE CITY'S CONTINUED RELIANCE ON SUGGESTIONS REGARDING
SNYDER'S SINCERITY IS ILL FOUNDED.
The City continues to suggest that its assessment of

Snyder's religious beliefs is pertinent to this inquiry.
of Appellees, p. 27.

Brief

Snyder has sworn under oath that his

religious belief's are sincere and deeply held.
must be accepted as true.

His affirmations

They are uncontroverted.

The best and only reliable indications of Snyder's
earnestness are his own sworn statements that his beliefs are
sincere.

Under oath, Snyder has stated

[My] personal and strongly held religious belief is that
prayers are a private matter between an individual and
his or her God. [My] religious upbringing and beliefs
lead [me] to believe that Jesus Christ specifically spoke
out against public prayers, including prayers before
government meetings.
Affidavit of Snyder, 1 26 (R. 58). In making this assertion,
Snyder relies on Matthew

6:5-6 from the New Testament

13:5-6 from the Book of Mormon.

Snyder believes that
14

and 3 Nephi

[u]sing God's name or the name of Christ in a public
prayer (directly contrary to God's clear teaching) is
blasphemous, irreverent, and impious misuse of those
names.
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, 1 33 (R. 88).
Snyder's sincerity and the religious nature of Snyder's
beliefs are evident.

He cites the religious basis for his

opposition to public prayer.

Snyder's belief is not unique. He

strongly believes it not merely unwise or politically
manipulative to open public meetings with prayer, but that it is
blasphemy.

His belief is based on his religious upbringing and

his understanding of portions of the Bible
and the commandments of Jesus Christ.

and the Book of Mormon

His convictions are

sincerely-held religious beliefs, guaranteed protection under the
Utah Constitution.
The City suggests that Snyder's motivation for giving his
Opening Prayer is also relevant to determining if Snyder's prayer
is religious exercise.

Brief of Appellees, pp. 27-28.

However,

Snyder's motivation for giving his Opening Prayer—to share with
the City Council his aversion to public prayer as dictated by his
religious views—is not any more indicative of the sincerity of
his beliefs than the City's attempted assessment of Snyder's
state of mind.
sincerity.

An individual's motivations are not indicative of

Snyder can most certainly and most consistently hold

his beliefs—for example that God might be female, that public
prayer is hypocritical and that a wall should be erected between
15

church and state—and simultaneously wish to present these
beliefs at the Opening Ceremonies.

Indeed, the strength and

sincerity of Snyder's beliefs prompted his desire to share these
beliefs for the reasons the City finds so disturbing.

Snyder

wanted to reveal and explain the impropriety of the City's public
prayer policy to the City's government.

There is no better forum

to suggest the religiously based impropriety of government
sponsored public prayer than during an opening ceremony and
prayer designed for that purpose.
The City must accept as true the sincerity of Snyder's
beliefs.
exercise.

Snyder's Opening Prayer is a prayer and a religious
The City did not remain neutral as to Snyder's

religious exercise.

This Court should find that under Society of

Separationists, Murray City violated Snyder's Art. I, § 4 right
to perfect religious toleration and free exercise.
III.
A.

FREE SPEECH
SNYDER'S FREE SPEECH CLAIM IS TIMELY AND WAS PROPERLY BEFORE
THE COURT BELOW.
The City asserts that Snyder's Free Speech 1) was properly

dismissed by the court below as time-barred, and 2) that Snyder
did not preserve his claim in this matter therein.
Appellees, p. 28-30.

Brief of

Statute of limitations was raised by the

City for the first time at oral arguments.
time to prepare to defend the City's motion.

16

Snyder was given no
The City,

ironically, now asserts that Snyder did not preserve his right to
present legal grounds or theories for the City's oral motion.
The City asserts that "until Mr. Snyder filed his opening brief,
the City did not know, and did not have reason to know, that Mr.
Snyder intended to rely upon this argument. . ."in relation to
the statute of limitations.2

Brief of Appellees, p. 29.

Similarly, Snyder did not know that the City would raise this
issue at oral arguments, nor did he have reason to know that the
trial court would grant such motion.

As a result of the City's

actions, Snyder's first opportunity to brief this issue is now
before this Court.
This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have recognized a
"continuing wrong" theory when applying a statute of limitations.
See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1995)
(in action for nuisance or trespass, statute of limitations
depends on whether a nuisance or trespass is permanent or
continuing); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (Orme, J., concurring) ("Courts have applied the
"continuing wrong" theory in a variety of contexts, particularly
where civil rights are at stake.").

2

The City is less than sincere in its assertion that it
does not know the grounds and basis of Snyder's claims herein.
As noted by the City (repeatedly), this matter has been ongoing
for nearly seven (7) years.
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The City lacks guidelines and criteria as to who can speak
during the prayer portions of the Opening Ceremonies of the City
Council meetings.

In 1994, in 1999 (when this action was filed)

and even today, the City claims the right to reject a prayer
based upon a subjective unwritten criteria.

The City takes the

position today as in 1999 that Utah law does not afford Snyder
access to the prayer portion of the City Council meetings.
Snyder's Free Speech claim is a facial challenge to the current
unwritten policies and practices of the City.
Snyder's Complaint asks for prospective injunctive relief.
Complaint, II 1, 4 & 54 (R. 2, 3, 15), & % 4 (relief) (R. 16).
That equitable relief is based upon continuing misconduct of the
City.

The factual allegations of the Complaint recite the status

of the City' s prayer policy as of the date of the Complaint
(August 1999), as well as prior problems occurring in 1994.
As a result, the court below erred in holding that Snyder's
free speech claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
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B.

BY REFUSING TO ALLOW SNYDER TO PRAY BEFORE THE MURRAY CITY
COUNCIL, THE CITY VIOLATED ARTICLE I, § 15 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Murray City has created a designated public forum.3

The

City argues that the Opening Ceremony is a nonpublic forum and as
such, they were justified in limiting the speech therein.
City is in error.

The

The City has created a designated public

forum; this Court need merely examine "the policy and practice of
the government," as well as "the nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity."

Cornelius v. NAACP

Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
In the case at bar, the City sought
to assure a broad cross-section of the community was
represented. It made a list of diverse congregations,
groups and associations within the community and invited
people from such groups to give a thought, expression or
prayer at the commencement of Council Meetings.
Participants
have
included
Native Americans
and
representatives from Zen Buddhists, a cross section of
Judeo-Christian congregations, Quakers and others.
Brief of Appellees, p. 6.

The City has not developed any written

guidelines as to offering of prayers.4

Hall Depo., 25:1-13,

3

The City attempts to distinguish between a limited public
forum and a designated public forum. Brief of Appellees, p. 31
n.15. There is little distinction between the two categories.
Of importance herein, the City created a limited or a designated
public forum wherein certain speech is allowed. Having so done,
the City cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination in prohibiting
access to the forum.
4

The City refers to "the genre of legislative prayer."
See e.g. Brief of Appellees, 33, 35, 41-44. The Utah genre of
legislative prayer is defined in Society of Separationists and
not by Murray City. The City may desire only, generic, uplifting
19

119:9-15, 151:23 to 152:11 (R. 147, 168, 175). These facts
indicate and demonstrate "on the part of the City [intent] to
designate the reverence period as a public forum open to members
of the community for the purpose of conveying religious and/or
inspirational messages."

Snyder v. Murray City, Corp., 159 F.3d

1227, 1245 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
The Opening Ceremony is a limited (or designated) public
forum.

As a result, the City must prove that any "regulation is

necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."

Perry, Education Assn. v.

Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
The City has not done so.

The sole interest that the City has

asserted is its right to promote "high mindedness", "order" and
"civility."

These are simply not compelling interests to justify

the restriction of free speech under the Utah Constitution.
As a result, this Court should reverse the dismissal of
Snyder's free speech claims.
V. MURRAY CITY'S PRACTICE OF PRAYERS BEFORE CITY COUNCIL
MEETINGS IS NOT APPLIED IN A NEUTRAL MATTER AND VIOLATES ARTICLE
I, § 4 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The City addresses the application of Society of
Separationists as virtually a side-note.

Brief of Appellees, p.

or self aggrandizing prayers, but in Utah the legislative prayer
session must welcome all comers and thoughts, even those that
grate and challenge norms. Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d
at 938.
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41.

The City boldly asserts that its policy is applied " 'without

regard to the belief system' of the participant."

Brief of

Appellees, p. 42 (quoting Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at
That is false.5

938).

City's assertion.

The facts at bar clearly controvert the

The City admits to have examined Snyder's

beliefs, and determined them not to be sincere. Nevertheless,
the City now claims that it does not examine the belief system of
the participant.

The City is not being forthright.

Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution does not permit public
expenditures and the use of public property to "directly" benefit
religious exercise.
37.

Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 936-

Thus, the City may encourage public prayer at its City

Council meetings only when "the state is neutral" and thereby
"indirectly" benefitting religious exercise.
To be neutral, government benefits "must be provided on a
nondiscriminatory basis" and "must be equally accessible to all."
Id. at 938. Thus, "if a city permits groups to use city-owned
facilities, that use must be permitted without regard to the

5

The City also asserts, incorrectly, that "Appellant was
not excluded because Mr. Hall or the City disagreed with
Appellant's religious beliefs, as he maintains . . . ." Brief of
Appellees, p. 44. In his speech claim, Snyder does not contend
that is was direct "disagreement" with his ideas that caused the
rejection. Rather, the constitutional violation occurred when
the City rejected his prayer based upon a detailed review of the
content and viewpoint of Snyder's expression. That Hall and the
City disagreed with Snyder is not as damning as the content and
viewpoint based rejection.
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belief system of the user,"

Id. (emphasis added).

In addition,

"the government must implement a system that awards the benefit
so that each group, religious or secular, has a realistically
equal opportunity for the use of the public resource."

Id.6

The City's bias against Snyder's religious message violates
the "neutrality principal" the this Court found in Art. I, § 4.
Id. at 937-938.

The City has provided a state benefit—the

opportunity to pray during its Opening Ceremonies—to only some
religious practitioners.

Those, like Snyder, who express non-

traditional or unorthodox religious viewpoints, are prohibited
from participating in religious offerings before the City
Council.

Indeed, the Utah Constitution requires government

neutrality between religion and non-religion.

Thus, the City's

argument that it could refuse to allow Snyder to participate in
the Opening Ceremonies because Snyder's message was political
also fails.

Under Art. I, § 4, the City cannot discriminate

against Mr. Snyder because it finds his religious message is
secular.

Society of Separationists, 870 P.2d at 938.

The City violates the establishment clause by favoring
certain religious views over others; by creating a religious
forum, inviting members from a variety of religious groups to
pray in that forum while denying Snyder equal opportunity to

6

This holding prohibits the City's rejection of Snyder's
prayer because it was secular, i.e., political or philosophical.
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express his religious views there, the City has violated the
neutrality requirement of the establishment clause.
Murray City's banning of Snyder's prayer impermissibly
establishes religion in violation of Article I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution.

The City determines which religious beliefs are

appropriate for expression.

The City's actions violate the clear

neutrality mandate of this Court in Society of Separationists.

IV. DUE PROCESS: THE CITY PROVIDED SNYDER WITH NO DUE PROCESS
IN HIS REQUEST TO PRESENT HIS PRAYER.
The City asserts that "the concept of due process is that
some procedure minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions."'
of Appellees, p. 45.

Brief

The City offers no discussion as to the due

process that Snyder was afforded, because indeed the City
afforded Snyder absolutely none.

Completely depriving Snyder of

any due process, the City gave him no hearing whatsoever.
The essential requirements of due process are notice and an
opportunity to respond.

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,

470 U.S. 543, 546 (1985).

"The opportunity to present reasons,

either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be
taken is a fundamental due process requirement."

Id.

The City

failed to supply Snyder with even basic protection.
The City suggests that Snyder had no interest at stake.
Brief of Appellees, p. 46.

The private interest at stake is

Snyder's right to free expression and exercise of his religious
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beliefs, a fundamental guarantee under the Utah Constitution.
The risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used is
great and apparent.

Simple due process protections—written

criteria, notice, an opportunity to respond, an impartial
arbiter, findings, notice of the right to appeal, an appellate
review—may have prevented the harm to Snyder.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The decision of the court below is in error and should be
reversed.

The conduct of Murray City and City Attorney Hall

violated the free speech, free exercise, establishment and due
process provisions of the Utah Constitution.

Having created and

opened a forum for expression, the City and Hall can not censor
ideas based upon viewpoint or content.

Snyder must be allowed to

present his prayer at the important and reverent time set aside
by the City for prayers before its council meetings.

Snyder must

be treated fairly and equitably in the same manner as all others
offering prayers.
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